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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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                                             13 CR 0268-2(JMF)
                 V.
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     VADIM TRINCHER,
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                     Defendant.
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                                              New York, N.Y.
                                              April 30, 2014
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                                              11:30 a.m.
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      Before:
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                           HON. JESSE M. FURMAN,
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                                              District Judge
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                                APPEARANCES
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     PREET BHARARA
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           United States Attorney for the
           Southern District of New York
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      JOSHUA NAFTALIS
          Assistant United States Attorney
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     MARTIN WEINBERG
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          Attorney for Defendant
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     ALSO PRESENT: ANDREW TARUTZ, Russian Interpreter
                     NELLY ALISHAEV, Russian Interpreter
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                     ROBERT HANRATTY, FBI Agent
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(Case called)

MR. NAFTALIS: Josh Naftalis for the government. With me at counsel table is Robert Hanratty for the F.B.I.

MR. WEINBERG: Good morning, your Honor. Martin Weinberg on behalf of Vadim Trincher, who sits to my left.

THE COURT: Good morning to both of you.

We are joined by not one but two Russian interpreters, both of whom have oaths that are on file with the clerk's office.

I want to confirm, Mr. Trincher, that you are able to understand the interpreter and there's no trouble with the equipment.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: If at any point during this proceeding you have trouble understanding, and I know you speak some English, but I see that you are availing yourself of the opportunity to use the services of the interpreter, just let me know and we will take care of it.

THE DEFENDANT: It would be better to listen in Russian.

THE COURT: That's fine. I want you to let me know if there's any trouble with your understanding --

THE DEFENDANT: With the terminology.

THE COURT: Not a problem, but do me one favor, which is don't speak until I finish speaking because the court

reporter here has to --

THE DEFENDANT: Sorry.

THE COURT: You did it again. Wait until I'm done so that the court reporter can record everything that I say and everything that you say and everything that happens here today.

Again, let me know if you have any trouble understanding either in English or with the assistance of the Russian interpreter, okay?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Very good.

We are here today for purposes of sentencing. In preparation for today's proceeding, I have reviewed the presentence report dated April 22, 2014. I have also received and reviewed the following additional submissions: The defendant's submissions filed April 15, 2014, as well as the attachments to that submission, which include letters addressed to me from the defendant's wife, sister-in-law, the mother of his third child, other relatives and friends; the submission filed initially on April 28 and then refiled after a filing error on April 29; and the submission of the codefendant Anatoly Golubchik filed April 25, 2014, which was incorporated by reference in Mr. Trincher's letter of April 28. I have also received and reviewed the government's submission filed on April 23, 2013.

Are there any additional submissions that I should

have received?

MR. NAFTALIS: Not from the government.

MR. WEINBERG: Not from the defendant.

THE COURT: Very well.

Mr. Weinberg, have you read the presentence report?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  WEINBERG: I have read the presentence report, as has  $\operatorname{Mr.}$  Trincher.

THE COURT: Have you discussed it with Mr. Trincher?

MR. WEINBERG: We have discussed the presentence report, your Honor.

THE COURT: Putting aside the calculation of the sentencing guidelines for a moment, are there any objections to the report with respect to its factual accuracy?

MR. WEINBERG: There is just one objection that I discussed with Mr. Naftalis and with Mr. Fischman before him. The objection is to the last sentence in paragraph 34 where the probation officer mistakenly represents the government's position on the amount of laundered funds to be 150 million, when, in fact, the government's position, as your Honor knows, it's 100. The government has agreed with my objection and we ask that the probation report be amended.

THE COURT: I actually was wondering about that myself as that was the first time I had seen reference to 150 million, which also is repeated in the probation department's recommendation portion of the presentence report.

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Mr. Naftalis, is there any objection to making that 1 2 change? 3 MR. NAFTALIS: No, your Honor. That's correct. THE COURT: I will direct that the last sentence of 4 5 paragraph 34 and the recommendation be changed from 150 million to \$100 million. 6 7 Mr. Trincher, have you reviewed or read the presentence report? 8 9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 10 THE COURT: Did you do so in English or was it 11 translated for you into Russian? 12 THE DEFENDANT: English. 13 THE COURT: Were you able to understand it in English? 14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 15 THE COURT: Did you discuss it with Mr. Weinberg? 16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 17 THE COURT: Did you have enough time to go over it 18 with Mr. Weinberg --19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did so. 20 THE COURT: You have to wait for me to finish, 21 remember. 22 Did you have enough time to go over with him any 23 mistakes in the report or anything that you wish to bring to my 24 attention today?

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No.

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT: Did you have enough time to discuss those things with him?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Naftalis, have you reviewed the presentence report?

MR. NAFTALIS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Putting aside the sentencing guidelines for a moment, again, are there any objections, beyond the correction we have already made, to the factual accuracy of the report?

MR. NAFTALIS: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Hearing no objections, other than the one that was made and the change I have already directed, I will otherwise adopt the factual recitations set forth in the presentence report which will be made a part of the record in this matter and placed under seal.

If an appeal is taken, counsel on appeal may have access to the sealed report without further application to the Court.

As counsel are aware, I am no longer required to follow the United States Sentencing Guidelines, but I am required to consider the applicable guidelines range in imposing sentence and must therefore accurately calculate the sentencing guidelines range.

In this case, there was a plea agreement in which the

parties stipulated to a particular calculation of the sentencing guidelines. I take it that the sentencing guidelines range calculated by the probation department is the same as the range to which the parties agreed in that agreement.

Is that correct, Mr. Weinberg?

MR. WEINBERG: Yes, it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Naftalis.

MR. NAFTALIS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: That agreement notwithstanding, I directed the parties, in an order on Monday, to be prepared to address the question of whether an aggravating role enhancement was warranted pursuant to Section 3B1.1 of the guidelines.

As Mr. Weinberg certainly knows, this was an issue that was discussed at some length yesterday at the sentencing of Mr. Golubchik.

As I indicated yesterday, I was frankly a little puzzled by the absence of the enhancement in the plea agreement and in the probation report. Again, as with Mr. Golubchik, it would appear to me to apply on its face; that is to say, there does not seem to be any real dispute that Mr. Trincher was a leader or organizer in this case, and that is stated expressly in paragraph 34 of the presentence report. It does not seem there could be any real dispute that there are at least five participants in that criminal activity or that it was otherwise

extensive within the meaning of the guidelines' provision.

Mr. Naftalis, I assume you take the same position you took yesterday, which is that you're not seeking the enhancement, but you do not deny that it could be applied.

MR. NAFTALIS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Weinberg, do you wish to be heard on this?

MR. WEINBERG: Very briefly. I don't intend to reecho yesterday's arguments. I would, however, want to adopt the argument regarding the government's breach of the spirit of the agreement.

I would want to ask the Court to consider a slight derivative of the role argument and I'll do it very briefly, which is that unlike Mr. Golubchik, Mr. Trincher had a leadership role, or like Mr. Golubchik, Mr. Trincher had a leadership role in the gambling portion of the R.I.C.O. enterprise. He deferred to Mr. Golubchik, who was not a supervisor or organizer, although he was a beneficiary of the monies that came from Russia, the Ukraine, to Cyprus and, thereafter, to the United States, that part of the money laundering.

I'm not contending he's not liable for that predicate. He pled to that predicate. He's guilty of it. He profited from it.

I'm not making a distinction regarding their receipt

of revenues. But in terms of supervision, in terms of active involvement in the money laundering aspect, the indictment is, as well as the government's position at the Golubchik bail hearing, demonstrates that there's some separation between the two. The role issue comes down to role as required to be assessed by the R.I.C.O. enterprise, not by its predicates.

Whether or not a leadership role in the bookmaking predicate would constitute a leadership role in R.I.C.O. is a decision for the Court; secondly, I would want to preserve, and although I know your Honor rejected it yesterday, the extraterritoriality comes into play only here.

We have a hybrid enterprise. It, obviously, has a United States component. Mr. Trincher pled to it. He's not in any way challenging that plea. He's guilty. *Morrison* doesn't apply to the factual basis that there was a United States nexus to the enterprise.

But as to his supervision, his management, his organization, it was not of Americans. It was of Ukrainians. Ukrainian bookmakers are clearly involved with the leadership role, and I would not challenge the factual predicate for it.

The circuit has said foreign crimes are not relevant conduct. *Vilar* says a purely foreign offense cannot raise the value. The Court has not dealt with leadership of foreign parties in a hybrid enterprise for role.

The only argument I'd make is that the role adjustment

requires that your Honor find that they were criminal participants. Purely foreign conduct is not a criminal participation.

It's up to your Honor to decide in this overarching R.I.C.O. where there's an American nexus whether a Ukrainian bookmaker who never came to the America, who never took a United States' bet, but who he clearly supervised - I don't deny that part, and I don't deny the extensiveness of the five or more parties aspect, but I just want to preserve the issue because I think this whole application of Morrison in sentencing through Vilar and other cases is in the less certain/unknown territory, and that would be my argument.

He's had leadership and bookmaking. Bookmaking is part of the R.I.C.O. Whether he's a leader of the R.I.C.O. is your Honor's determination based on that argument.

THE COURT: As you know, yesterday Mr. Naftalis argued that there are at least five participants here domestically and identified, among others, some codefendants in this case.

Do you dispute that they would qualify as participants for purposes of the enhancement?

MR. WEINBERG: No, but I would quarrel with the proposition that he had a supervisory, management role of Mr. Greenberg, Mr. Sall, and any of the people who were involved in the money laundering side of the case.

In fact, the indictment, when it describes

Mr. Golubchik versus Mr. Trincher, it says that Mr. Trincher was a leader of the bookmaking; and it then says Mr. Golubchik was a leader of the bookmaking. And it adds as to
Mr. Golubchik, and this is in paragraph nine of the indictment, that Mr. Golubchik worked with Trincher to oversee the sports gambling, directed members of the associates in the organization in laundering tens of millions of dollars, a representation that properly was not made as to Mr. Trincher.

During the bail hearing before your Honor, the government, Mr. Naftalis, represented correctly that Golubchik, quote, on page 17, "actually has more access to money than Mr. Trincher. Mr. Golubchik was more of a money launderer."

I represent, through the reading of the extensive line sheets and summaries of the Russian conversations, he deferred to Mr. Golubchik when it came to money issues, investment issues, banking issues, laundering issues.

He's guilty of the R.I.C.O. He's guilty of supervising the bookmakers in the Ukraine. There's certainly five or more people, but he didn't supervise Greenberg or Sall or any of the people who were involved in the investment of the money end.

THE COURT: Let me say at the outset, to the extent that you incorporated by reference the arguments made yesterday about breach, I incorporate by reference my ruling on those. I think they are without merit and, therefore, I'm not persuaded

on that score.

Mr. Naftalis, do you want to be heard or briefly respond to Mr. Weinberg with respect to, in particular, the distinctions, if any, to be drawn between Mr. Trincher and Mr. Golubchik and whether he would qualify as a leader of the enterprise or at large?

MR. NAFTALIS: Yes. We incorporate what we said yesterday, including that we are not seeking the leadership enhancement.

What I hear is in contention with what Mr. Lichtman said yesterday. Mr. Lichtman said everything is abroad and I'm the money launderer; and Mr. Weinberg is saying I'm the gambling guy and everything is abroad. So, it seems everything is abroad. In any event, they waived this.

I'm sitting here thinking I should be arguing someone breached because all of these issues that were waived are now coming up again. We're not taking that position, but I'm putting that aside.

THE COURT: I don't think they waived the issue of whether the enhancement applies. That's an issue I have raised, and Mr. Weinberg is making arguments that I think are properly made with respect to whether that enhancement should be applied.

My question to you is on the factual question.

MR. NAFTALIS: On the factual question.

THE COURT: Yes, on the factual question of
Mr. Trincher's leadership role, if any, or managerial role, if
any, with respect to the different components of the enterprise
here and where the participants in that conduct were located.

MR. NAFTALIS: I think it is fair to say that to the extent one of them had more of a money laundering role, it was Mr. Golubchik. Mr. Trincher, though, was setting all the lines and involved in the money laundering. They may have had different strengths, but I don't think that means one of them is less of a leader. There were certainly five domestic participants.

I'm honestly not sure whether you can strip out a predicate and argue that you're a leader with respect to one of the predicates. I think you're the leader with respect to R.I.C.O. and we should probably lump them. I'm shooting from the hip honestly, but it doesn't make sense to me that you can make *Morrison* arguments with respect to predicates when they have pled to domestic conduct anyway.

Putting that aside, I do accept the proposition that Mr. Golubchik was more of the money launderer than Mr. Trincher, but they both were doing the exact same thing. Maybe one of them set the lines more, being Mr. Trincher, but he's doing all of that here. To the extent that your Honor recognized yesterday there's a lot of money laundering abroad, this is why I think this argument falls apart, because they're

arguing against each other.

THE COURT: Are there five or more participants in the gambling piece of it in the United States, as well? Yesterday you mentioned Mr. Sall and Mr. Druzhinsky and the like. At least I think both of them, if I recall correctly, are more on the money laundering side of it.

Would you identify five or more on the gambling side of it to the extent that's even an intelligible distinction to draw?

MR. NAFTALIS: I don't think you can really draw the distinction. It's nice to argue it academically that they're separate, but obviously they overlap, which is why we went into this court, because if you're laundering your own proceeds, we're chasing our tail. There isn't sort of the money launders per se. The money launderers are supporting the gambling business, which is why we're in this guidelines problem.

There are certainly domestic participants here, including Sall Greenberg, Mr. Trincher, Mr. Trincher's son, Illya, Mr. Katchaloff, Mr. Druzhinsky, Mr. Shteyngrob.

Mr. Druzhinsky's organization overlaps with this enterprise.

The fact they aren't in the R.I.C.O. enterprise doesn't mean they wouldn't be counted for purposes of this five-person counting. I do think it's a distinction without a difference, but we easily meet it on both ends.

THE COURT: I do find that the leadership enhancement

applies under 3B1.1(a) and incorporate by reference my ruling on that score yesterday. The bottom line is that I think it's undisputed that Mr. Trincher was indeed a leader or organizer of criminal activity, at least as to part of the enterprise's activity. I think, too, it is ultimately impossible to disentangle the two in the sense that the money laundering was laundering the gambling proceeds and the gambling was furthered by the money laundering and vice versa. In that regard, I don't think there's a meaningful distinction to be drawn for purposes of whether somebody qualifies as a leader or manager. The law is you can be a leader or a manager of a portion of an enterprise in any event.

I also find without merit, for the reasons that I stated yesterday, any reliance or argument based on Morrison or Vilar here. To begin with, as a matter of law, I find it hard to imagine that the enhancement would not apply to someone who conducted their criminal activity from the United States and supervised people outside the United States in the sense that those people would be participants in criminal activity, the criminal activity to which someone pled. And the fact that they are physically located outside of the United States does not put them beyond the scope of this particular provision. It was cited as an example yesterday a drug conspiracy that occurs outside of the United States altogether with respect to drugs being sent into the United States.

Beyond that, I think the record here would support a finding that there were five or more participants, regardless; and regardless, that the criminal activity was quote/unquote otherwise extensive given the massive scope, scale and nature of the criminal activity at issue here.

The bottom line is, it's not a close call and the enhancement clearly does apply; and to the extent that Mr. Weinberg has arguments to the contrary, perhaps you can make those to the circuit depending on what my sentence ultimately is.

In light of that, and the parties' agreement as to the rest of the guidelines calculation and the absence of any objection as to the rest of the calculation, as well as my own independent evaluation of the guidelines, I find, using the November 2013 edition of the sentencing guidelines that the total offense level is 20, the Criminal History Category is I, the guidelines range is 33- to 41 months' imprisonment, and the fine range is 7500- to \$75,000.

Let's turn to the issue of departures. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed not to seek a departure from the guidelines range, either an upward or a downward departure.

Is that correct, Mr. Naftalis?

MR. NAFTALIS: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Weinberg.

MR. WEINBERG: Yes, your Honor.

an order yesterday indicating that counsel should be prepared to address the question of whether the government's argument for an upward variance on the grounds that the guidelines do not adequately take into consideration the offense conduct would be a basis for an upward departure pursuant to Section 5K2.0 of the guidelines; that is on the ground that this case presents circumstances of a kind or to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the guidelines.

As I indicated yesterday at the sentencing of Mr. Golubchik, the issue may ultimately be academic, but under Crosby and its progeny, the question of a departure is supposed to be treated as analytically and legally distinct from the question of a variance and is supposed to be addressed first, so that is what prompted me to raise the issue.

Let me ask at the outset, Mr. Weinberg. Obviously, as I indicated yesterday, the parties are entitled to notice before the Court contemplates or imposes any departure and that is reasonable notice, I think particularly because this sentencing is taking place a day later and you were present yesterday and the issue is fully joined in the parties' sentencing submissions, even if it was addressed and articulated there as a variance issue rather than a departure issue that you have gotten reasonable notice, but I want to confirm that you have read it.

MR. WEINBERG: I have read it.

THE COURT: Very good.

What I propose to do is what I did yesterday, which is to defer the question of the departure on that ground until after I hear from counsel more generally on the theory that your sentencing remarks may address the issue more broadly whether it is treated or viewed as an issue of a departure or an issue of a variance. I'm going to table that issue for a moment.

Putting that one issue aside, I have nevertheless reviewed whether there would be another basis for a departure within the guidelines' framework; that is, as distinct from what has come to be known as a variance. And I do not think that there are grounds that would support a departure in either direction.

Having settled all that, or at least most of that, Mr. Naftalis, do you wish to be heard with respect to sentencing?

Let me ask both counsel, obviously, both of you were present yesterday for the lengthy sentencing proceedings with respect to Mr. Golubchik. Obviously, Mr. Weinberg, you're entitled to make any arguments you want, even if they repeat arguments that I heard and ruled upon yesterday. But what might be most helpful to me is, to the extent that you think that Mr. Trincher is either similarly situated or different

from Mr. Golubchik, to certainly address that because, obviously, that is going to be a factor in my decision of what sentence to impose on Mr. Trincher.

With that introduction, Mr. Naftalis, is there anything you wish to say?

MR. NAFTALIS: We don't have anything else to add, other than to point out, as we did, that to the extent there is a distinction, I would say as a threshold matter, I don't think there's a distinction between Mr. Golubchik and Mr. Trincher with respect to what they did. If you're going to call one more of a money launderer versus a gambler, I think they're basically at the same level.

Mr. Trincher also brought his sons into the gambling business. I don't think it necessarily means the sentence should be different honestly, but we wanted to point out that both Illya and Eugene Trincher have been convicted for gambling-related offenses. It certainly speaks of the defendant's involvement in this business that he managed to pull his sons into it and, in our view, he was grooming them to take his role. The gambling business that Illya Trincher was running, it was basically a baby version of what Mr. Vadim Trincher was running. In the years to come, we expected that's what would have happened.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Weinberg, do you wish to be heard?

MR. WEINBERG: I do. May I speak from the podium?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. WEINBERG: Thank you, sir.

I don't intend to reecho the arguments of yesterday.

I intend instead, if your Honor please, to make either new ones or to augment an argument that I don't know was sufficiently presented.

I also want to do it in the context where I think the government and I agree that Mr. Golubchik was the engineer, the quarterback, the force in terms of money laundering, and, therefore, to the extent your Honor separates out bookmaking and money laundering, I think there is a principal distinction between the application of an upward departure/variance. If I use one term or another, I mean to present an argument that addresses both of those separate but related concepts and whether or not the guideline of 33 to 41 months ought to move upwards towards the 60 months.

Your Honor can consider the fact that Mr. Trincher deferred to Mr. Golubchik on matters of business, investments, banking, moving money, investing money, selecting businesses, supervising businesses. Mr. Trincher is a man, and this is not offered as an excuse in any way, who grew up in Kiev. He was denied an adequate education.

At age 28, he was able to emigrate to the United

States, bring his family with him, but didn't have the skills to be an American businessman. He had the brain but didn't have the education, didn't have the skills. And what he did was he stayed in touch with his early friends from Kiev, that he made a living for his family that had lost their business because they were trying to emigrate and they were denied the right to work in the old Soviet Union.

He made a living through the ten years after school through being a very successful card and backgammon player. He came to the United States. During those ten years, he met many of the people that became, when Gorbachev liberated the Ukraine from the Soviet Union, the people that became an oligarchs, the millionaires, the billionaires, the people who essentially made mega wealth through the ways that people in Russia and the Ukraine made that kind of wealth. They were his bettors. They were his clients.

He never had a United States bettor. He never made a dollar himself personally. He never received bets from the United States customers. There's a couple of satellite bettors that bet with Mr. Golubchik that he profited from indirectly because they had a partnership in business.

But his clientele, and the reason that this organization made so much money, were the owners of soccer teams in Kiev. They were the owners of apartment complexes in Moscow. They were these enormously wealthy people that were

placing recreational bets in large amounts which was the corollary of the bookmaker who won more than he lost making a lot of money. But once the money was made, the money was really owned and controlled and directed and engineered by Mr. Golubchik who had a far greater interest in facility and the operations of businesses and investments.

With that said, I think there are three or four principal bases where your Honor can either reconsider the application or consider whether or not an upward departure or an upward variation is needed for Mr. Trincher. It's an individualized sentence, and I think there is a distinction on the money laundering front that can justify a sentence different than that imposed yesterday.

First, let me, if I can, spend a few minutes setting out the objection that I would have made yesterday on an even playing field on the 5K2/3553. The first would be more of a legal objection that this is not a factor that the commission did not consider. And that doesn't eliminate it under 3553, but I suggest it raises the burden for an upward departure to find exceptional circumstances, rather than just circumstances not considered by the commission.

What we have here is 27 straight years since the formation of the commission, which was formulated to create national uniformity, of a base offense level 12 with no specific enhancements to the underlying specified unlawful

activity, that being bookmaking.

The Department of Justice knows how to ask for changes in the sentencing commission. They're a very forceful advocate for changes. The sentencing commission has amended the guidelines over 700 times. There has never been, to my knowledge, a demand or a request or a push from the Department of Justice to change the base offense level 12. I don't know of any other judge that has upwardly departed for bookmaking alone.

Again, this is a R.I.C.O. case and a money laundering case, so there are certain differences, but it's not as if there's a ground swell of judicial challenge to the base offense level 12 like there is, for instance, with child pornography guidelines or for drug guidelines or even for fraud guidelines for the lesser involved people where judges have regularly departed downward and registered their dissatisfaction with the architecture of the guidelines.

Money laundering is parallel to the bookmaking guideline where you have in 2001 a very deliberate decision made by the sentencing commission where there are judges on the sentencing commission, the most recent judge is the chief judge of my local court, Judge Saris from the District of Massachusetts.

They do hear when there are problems. They listen to the Department of Justice. They listen to the defense bar.

And yet since 2001, nobody has really challenged the idea that the direct money laundering guideline, which correlates to the underlying offense and increases the guideline for drug dealers and for major fraud people through the quantity of drugs, through the value, that there is no enhancement for bookmaking. That was a deliberate decision. Never challenged by the government, never challenged by the sentencing commission.

So what does that mean? Well, ignorance of the law is no defense. There ought to be some value in the fact that predictability and uniformity and knowledge of the law - even if it's constructive knowledge, because citizens clearly can't master the complexities of Title 18 of the sentencing guidelines - that a citizen would expect.

Forget the plea agreement. They would expect the guidelines are the guidelines and the courts do have the authority to go up or go down. It's not strictly ex post facto. We're dealing with whether the guidelines should be changed for a significant bookmaking operation that generates sufficient money, but there are some of those values of consistency and on predictability that do get destabilized when the government is seeking and the Court independently - I understand this is the Court's job - to independently judge under 3553 and 5K2 whether there is a factor the commission didn't consider.

I would first make the legal argument that the

commission did consider bookmaking. Bookmaking makes money. I gave your Honor a footnote on page four of the original sentencing brief, I quoted from the article of "The New York Times" where they talked about what an incredible amount of money is bet each year.

THE COURT: I remember the article.

MR. WEINBERG: Billions and billions, into the hundreds of billions of dollars are lost by sports bettors in America. He didn't make one of those dollars or if he made one, he made very little. The government has consistently and properly represented in the affidavits they catered to Russian and Ukrainian bettors. Maybe there's a small percentage that Mr. Golubchik took from U.S. bettors. But the thrust of it was they didn't even enter into this mega-billion-dollar business, but other bookmakers have. This is where I challenge the government that there's no factual basis for the government's position that this is some exceptional, extraordinary bookmaking operation.

Yes, there's a lot of money. And as someone who comes from my background, it's a lot of money, whether it's one-third of 50 million or one-half of 50, whatever it is, it's a lot of money. But in bookmaking, it's not huge, out of heartland extraordinary.

Yesterday, you asked a hypothetical that wasn't answered. Clearly, there's two anomalies here: What do we do

with Mr. Azen whose guidelines are higher than Mr. Trinchers'? What do we do about the bookmaker who wasn't indicted here who makes 2,000 bucks on a street corner and how do we compare that?

First, the commission decided that there is no value; but second, there are ways to address those two anomalies.

Your Honor addressed it with Mr. Azen. Had it not been for his violence, I'm not the Judge, obviously, I can't testify to the assessment, but your Honor did say there is a pattern of violence, a reputation for violence with Mr. Azen. People went to him to collect. His guideline was 18, his sentence was 18, but it may well have been less with your Honor's deciding how do I temper, moderate what is an extreme third-party money launder in the guidelines?

Judges do that in fraud cases where people are involved in a large fraud, but they're at the very bottom and judges consistently individualize the sentence. There is a principled way to bridge the two people through a downward departure.

I would suggest for a \$2,000 bookmaker, first, he wouldn't be federally indicted. He would be state-indicted. He would not end up with a jail sentence. Bookmakers regularly get probation. The Pinnacle defendants got probation in Queens.

Bookmaking, whatever we think of it, whatever its

effect, has not resulted in large jail sentences. And I would represent to your Honor that I did a quick survey, including asking Mr. Chesnoff, who knows bookmaking cases like New York lawyers know insider trading cases.

In the Jay Cohen case, the leading Second Circuit precedent, it's a much larger case. In that case, he received a 21-month sentence, I'll check my notes, but it was in the twenties. He went to trial and lost. His codefendant got a nonjail sentence from Judge Wood.

Mr. Gorean in Florida fell all over the wiretap applications, a major bookmaker, Northern District of New York. He was denied bail, he did a year in jail, major money laundering. He got money laundering plus four for the specific offense, down three. He got time served, one year.

The biggest bookmaker, a billion-dollar bookmaker named Kaplan who got arrested and convicted, he got 51 months, and that was Bet On Sports, B.O.S., a billion-dollar bookmaker.

I would submit that these internet bookmaking companies, like the poker companies that Judge Kaplan addressed, make hundreds and hundreds of millions, that they take American bets, that they make money from American bettors, that they're within the heartland of why the federal government federally criminalized bookmaking, which is to protect United States citizens, not to protect some Ukrainian oligarch.

I would, therefore, make the two principal arguments

that, one, the commission has considered the amount of money that a bookmaker makes. They have considered its longevity, its scope, its profits, its proceeds. It has concluded that that is not a factor. That is a factor the commission considered and not a factor that they want to use, unlike in other crimes; secondly, despite the fraction, whether it's a half or a third of the money, whether it's 50 or 100, sadly, perhaps, this is not an exceptionally large bookmaking operation.

To the extent it's sizeable, the atypicality, I would suggest, cuts against aggravation because it's not the New York bettor. It's not the small bettor. In Cohen they talked about 1600 Americans bet through Jay Cohen's operation ten years ago out of 16,000 bettors in all.

He had 15. Most of them were his friends. All of them could afford to lose money.

I would recommend to the Court to consider as to Trincher whose conduct, to the extent it's aggravated, it's as a bookmaker, not a money launderer, that your Honor reject the government's request for an upward departure.

I would also contend, your Honor, that as a proportionality matter, I don't want to, again, burden the Druzhinsky sentencing. The guideline sentence of 33 to 41 months would be a multiple of ten or 11 or 12 or 13 more than the jail portion of Mr. Druzhinsky's sentence; that although

his money laundering was four million, not X million, even when the commission deals with money, they don't double the sentence for each doubling of the money.

For instance, when you go from one million to 2.5 million in the 2B1.1 table, it goes up two levels from 14. It doesn't go from 14 to 28. So, the commission understands the gravity of the sentence cannot simply be a multiple of the amount of money.

I would submit with Mr. Druzhinsky, he took American bets. He wanted some of Mr. Golubchik's clients according to the evidence, that he was a bookmaker and money launderer, and that Mr. Trincher's conduct is not ten or 12 times graver or requiring a sentence of ten or 12 times, which would be the guideline, and certainly not 20 times as serious in terms of the rationales for sentencing, which is to deter. Yesterday's sentence would deter anyone. And sentences of short, discreet consistency, it's always been taught that that deters people who are deterrable.

Punishment, whether it's three years, Judge, anything over what he negotiated to is serious punishment. I would ask the Court on a proportionality ground — I understand the Court wants to position defendants in a multiple-defendant case, it's perfectly appropriate to deal with disparity and proportionality, but to multiply his sentence 20 times is unwarranted disparity, and that would be the result if your

Honor imposed the 60-month sentence on Mr. Trincher.

I would also ask the Court to remember, as I have said, that his bettors were not U.S. bettors. I think he, therefore, falls outside of the heartland in a way that is inconsistent with magnifying his punishment more than someone who took bets from a United States bettor. It doesn't excuse it. Certainly, the money came into the U.S. and he used the phones. Had he used the phones in Moscow, this would be a licensing issue, not a R.I.C.O. issue. It doesn't excuse it. It doesn't explain it. He's guilty. He admits it.

I want to focus, if I can, because I don't know if the government is still pushing the Marik call. I hope they're not. I think I shared the total records that these are best friends kidding, and if the Court does not want me to address that, I won't.

THE COURT: Unless the government does want to press the point, then I'm persuaded by your arguments that that is probably more innocuous than the government suggested initially. So I don't think you need to spend any time on that.

MR. WEINBERG: I do, however, want to address, I don't know how to pronounce his name, so I'll say Tokhtakhounov. The probation report represents what it represents. At the time, I didn't object. I didn't think it was material, given my understanding that the government was going to recommend a

guidelines sentence, but the facts are as follows:

The government wiretapped Mr. Trincher and Mr. Golubchik for five months. That was two years ago. There has not been any evidence presented to the Court in terms of any suggestion that the sentence should be effected or enhanced for violence. There's been no evidence that anyone was harmed. There's been no evidence that any identifiable bettor was threatened. There's certainly no evidence on these tapes that Mr. Trincher threatened anybody.

He's a businessman. The tapes are replete with him saying give it time, he'll pay, he'll pay slowly. He'll pay by the month. He never asked Tokhtakhounov, go get my money and threaten people, implicitly or explicitly. I can't speak for what happens in Moscow.

I can speak to, that after studying this case and many months of call sheets, there's no evidence that he threatened anybody or asked for anyone to threaten anyone or asked for anyone to go collect money through use of extortionate means, and the government didn't ask him to plead to an extortionate predicate. Thousands of wiretaps two years ago is not a trustworthy basis to enhance his sentence on violence.

Going to these two conversations with Mr. Golubchik, not with Mr. Trincher, but to the extent that it spills over, I can't ignore the effect. The first of the two, they were discussing a bettor named Tatarin. He is recommended to them

by Mr. Tokhtakhounov as someone who made 50 million bucks and wanted to bet, and that he, Tokhtakhounov, would say I think it's a good bet to take. He left it up to Mr. Trincher and Mr. Golubchik, and they ended up not taking him as a bettor.

Through the continuation of the wiretaps, it would reflect he was not betting with them in late May and June of 2012. They said no, which I think is consistent with the fact that they didn't want a bettor who caused problems, who complained, who would be a problem. They didn't want to rely on any kind of improper collection.

Part of what the government reads in, and none of us were there in Moscow and we're not on the streets and we're here thousands of miles away, is that some of the conversations the government may think have a scent of violence are talking about reputational threats, not violent threats. These are billionaires, oligarchs who want to bet. It's their past time. It's even more ingrained in their culture than it is in America.

If they don't pay their bets, then they're shamed or, as Mr. Tokhtakhounov said in one of these two conversations, I'm going to put up a stink, which means they'll spread the word that you can't trust this person. And that's the second conversation about a man named Roma, who, in other tapes, it showed he was going out buying Moscow houses for 20 million each and he was going to London for a \$50 million business deal

and he wasn't paying his gambling debts. There's discussion there, but again no evidence, that he was ever threatened and no evidence that he was ever harmed. In fact, in tape 2043, it's Roma threatening Vadim Trincher for not taking his bet, which was discussed in a later conversation as well.

All of it is not to disregard the fact that the government has indicted Mr. Tokhtakhounov as an independent codefendant in Moscow, but when we're individualizing sentence, your Honor, this is not a violent man. He is not a man that resorted to violence. He's not a man who asked anyone else to resort to violence. And the best proof in this respect is the government's own tape where they elected not to take a bettor who, quote, was a complainer, according to the transcript.

I want to talk briefly about the suggestion that his sickness should be affected by his relationship to his sons, both of whom are in court, both of whom, whatever their transgressions, they were not part of his bookmaking.

Mr. Trincher, on one hand, didn't accept the American multimillionaires that played poker with Illya Trincher. And I'm not going to get ahead of his own sentencing arguments that will be presented to your Honor, but most of what Illya learned from his father, to the extent he learned gambling, it was to be a poker player.

This man is a world-class poker player. He's won tournaments at Foxwood's. He's won tournaments in Las Vegas.

Check the internet and what you'll see right behind this case is references to the Trinchers as professional poker players. Yes, Illya Trincher learned poker skills. He also learned chess skills.

There's a letter from Daniel's mother or from Mrs. Trincher. They both wrote letters about Vadim Trincher, the father of his 12-year-old son, and how when he comes to the house, they successfully integrated the families because Vadim Trincher couldn't leave his house to continue to go three times a week to see his son's swim meets, attend his son's classes, which he did religiously according to the mother of Daniel, who is also present in court.

But Mrs. Trincher talks about the home and all of them coming together and the three chessboards at a table. The wiretaps show Illya asking his dad about a love relation and his dad saying follow your heart, make your own decision.

You have letter after letter from some of the people that are here. Marcus Gordon is in the first row. There are a lot of people that trusted Vadim Trincher with \$10 million, more than most or all of them had. He met their trust. He conformed to the conditions of bail.

They wrote letters to the Court. I know the Court has read them. I'm not going to burden the Court, but there are two sides to this man, neither of them are violent. Neither of them are of a sophisticated money launderer.

One of them is that he grew up in the world of gambling and he never abandoned it, and he regrets that. He understands it's an American crime and understands he shamed himself with his family and he shamed himself with his mother, which hurts him to the core.

Another side of him is that he is a gentle mentor. He mentored other children. You have letter after letter that he didn't just throw money at charities. He put his time, wisdom, and guidance on the line. He's a good man.

I ask your Honor to please consider giving him a sentence at the guidelines as enhanced by the role.

Thirty-three to 41 months is more than sufficient. Time in jail crawls according to people that have talked about it.

It's a numbing experience. That sends a message. That's sufficient deterrence and punishment, and that's certainly the kind of sentence that will extinguish any risk that

Mr. Trincher will ever go back to the life he led.

Since I met him, he's been under house arrest. He wanted to learn English better. He wanted to go to school. He wants to learn computer skills. He wants to be a member of our society. He has the brains and the ethics to do it. He'll never be before the Court again. Please give him a guideline sentence, Judge.

Thank you.

THE COURT: One question to you, Mr. Weinberg, before

1 | you sit down.

I know the defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to providing financial information to probation.

MR. WEINBERG: Yes.

THE COURT: Is there any dispute he would be capable of paying a fine in this case?

MR. WEINBERG: There is none, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. WEINBERG: Thank you, sir.

MR. NAFTALIS: Can I reply briefly on this.

THE COURT: Yes. I actually would like you to reply briefly in particular to the argument that Mr. Weinberg made, which was not really made yesterday, which is that this case is not exceptional or out of the heartland in its scale or scope, that there are other bookmaking enterprises and the like that are similar or graver in size.

If you could address that in addition to whatever else you want to respond to, go ahead.

MR. NAFTALIS: Yes. I'll start with that question.

To our knowledge, this is one of the biggest bookmaking operations in the world. To hear it here, it's as if we picked off something on the street corner. This is a R.I.C.O. enterprise, which I think is getting lost in the guidelines discussion, operated by two men affiliated with a man, one of

the highest levels of organized crime in Russia, who ran a massive sports bar. I don't know of any other case that's this big.

We're now saying that \$100 million isn't a lot of money. I thought that was a lot of money.

THE COURT: Do you know anything about the cases that Mr. Weinberg cited, because I confess, I don't know.

MR. NAFTALIS: I know the *Pinnacle* case. I don't know the scale of it honestly, but those are not R.I.C.O. cases, which I think is what every defendant yesterday and today are running from. These men did not plead guilty to bookmaking. They pled guilty to being racketeers.

The problem we have is that the guidelines push you down to what we think of as just bookmaking, but that is not what your Honor is considering. Your Honor is considering whether two men who your Honor has found led a R.I.C.O. enterprise, what they should be sentenced to, not what two men who ran a book out of New York should be sentenced to. That is really the key question.

I would just reiterate that's the argument we were making in our memo, which was that the guidelines make you forget that it's R.I.C.O. because you keep coming back to the easiest and lowest offense.

We don't agree that there is a real difference between Mr. Trincher or Mr. Golubchik. We're, obviously, up here

Mr. Trincher was just as involved in money laundering. He's on all of the signature cards for the bank accounts. He is receiving equal share, which is laundered through all of these Cyprus shell accounts, into their hedge funds, real estate. They're doing the exact same thing. Maybe one of them did a little more than the other, but again, this is a R.I.C.O. case. They are sharing in tens and tens of millions of dollars. The calls make clear they are equal business partners. He is not Mr. Golubchik's servant. They are equal in all respects.

To distinguish the cases, which I confess I don't know much about, there was no tie to organized crime.

Mr. Tokhtakhounov is a vor; there is no dispute. The fact where on one wiretap for a few months and the fact that we don't have someone being hurt, that's always held against the government. But that is what his job is; that people are so afraid to cross him, that they pay. That is called extortion: Threat of the use of force.

When Mr. Trincher's home was raided by the F.B.I., there were tons of cell phones. Who knows what was going on with the other cell phones. The argument that nothing ever happened, we're equally in the dark. We know the phone we were on and we know what Mr. Tokhtakhounov's role was, which was to get people to pay.

These oligarchs, they came to New York to bet. So,

this overseas fiction that's being created, yes, a lot of it is overseas. When they came here from Kiev, they are betting in New York City. They traveled internationally back and forth. Mr. Trincher traveled internationally back and forth. The whole reason why they're coming here and moving their money here is because the American banking system is safe. That's why they're laundering money through Cyprus to the United States; because they're all afraid of what happens if we keep our money in a bank in Kiev or a bank in Moscow.

They are exploiting the U.S. banking system to run an international R.I.C.O. enterprise. That's why the sentence should be so high and that's why it's exceptional. This isn't a guy booking 20-dollar bets on the corner. This is someone who was affiliated with, and has pled to, being a part of a R.I.C.O. enterprise.

The sentence for Mr. Druzhinsky, he did not plead to being in a R.I.C.O. enterprise and he was doing much less. He had international clients, too. They're on a different scale. And there was no allegation that Mr. Druzhinsky was affiliated with Mr. Tokhtakhounov.

The calls, to read them innocently, every defendant comes up here and says we read these things so aggressively. You read them and it's not just a hint. There's the implicit use of force that they are implying will be used. And we have the calls go send, I'm forgetting the names, effectively the

collectors overseas who are inheriting the reputation of Mr. Tokhtakhounov.

Overall, they should get the same sentence, your Honor. Then we do believe that to the extent there is some sort of mitigating argument, which I don't believe has any merit, bringing your children and then recruiting them to rise up is an aggravating factor.

All of these men, I'm sure, have wonderful families. That's not in dispute. The question is whether Mr. Trincher was teaching his children to take over a massive bookmaking operation. And they are picking up money for each other, they are coordinating, they are learning how to do international bookmaking and money laundering. So, the sentence should be the same. There is no difference at all.

To distinguish bookmaking from money laundering is a vague distinction, but it also ignores the fact this is a R.I.C.O. case and that's what I think the sentence comes down to.

MR. WEINBERG: May I respond for a moment.

THE COURT: You may briefly, and then I want to give the defendant an opportunity to be heard.

MR. WEINBERG: Very briefly.

One is, yes, it's a R.I.C.O. case, but his end that he managed was the bookmaking end, not the complexity of the money laundering. That distinguishes him from Mr. Golubchik. It

makes him more like the *Pinnacle* billionaires that ran the largest internet company. They got probation in Queens. Yes, they were not federally charged with R.I.C.O. It distinguishes him from other R.I.C.O. people.

Yes, whatever Tokhtakhounov is, he never asked him to use his organized crime influence to collect money in Kiev or Moscow. He's not a man of violence. And the proof of it is the government's own conversations that show they didn't take bets from anyone they thought could be a problem.

Second, I would suggest a sentence more in line with the bookmaking sentences, even with a small enhancement or the enhancement for R.I.C.O., would be appropriate which gets you -- we started with R.I.C.O. It's already been included in the plus-four role. Thirty-three to 41 is not a bookmaker sentence; it's a R.I.C.O. sentence, but I would contend it should not have the enhancement for being a sophisticated money launderer because he was a beneficiary but not the man that ran the money laundering.

Second, I can't let the statements about his two sons go. The government gave you two examples. On one, his son got on planes in Vegas. He had poker money that he invested in a poker game. Somebody won. He got it back. He paid one of Illya's — somebody said can you pay and Illya was in Los Angeles. He paid. His sons are not professional bookmakers. You'll hear about Illya and 99 percent of what he did crossed

over in the line. He'll talk to you about it. Mr. Chesnoff represents him. I'm not going to burden the Court with Illya. He didn't groom people to take over his business. That's just not fair and not right.

In fact, Illya Trincher, 28 years old, has never been to Moscow, never been to Kiev. He didn't introduce him to his childhood friends. Illya Trincher never took a bet from the people in Kiev and he never took a bet from the people that Illya Trincher was playing poker with who asked Illya, hey, please get a Laker game bet on. And they bet large amounts of money because they're very wealthy people.

It's not fair to attribute his conduct to them; and I would suggest, your Honor, that it's not fair for the government to argue that he's somehow grooming them to take over his business. That's completely incompatible with the facts of this case.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Trincher, is there anything that you wish to say before I impose sentence?

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I am reading because I'm a little bit nervous. I appreciate that you let me out on the bail and that you trust me, and I did not let you down.

I deeply sorry for my crime and will do the sentence you impose. I know the sentence may exceed my hopes. I know that Mr. Golubchik was sent to jail yesterday. And I ask you,

sir, and I ask you that you trust me again and let me self-surrender so I can say a proper good-bye to my --

THE COURT: Take a minute Mr. Trincher, if you'd like.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Say good-bye to my little boy and Yevgeney and Illya when they are sentenced, plus attend to some needed medical issue. That's it.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Counsel, is there any reason that sentence should not be imposed at this time?

MR. NAFTALIS: No, your Honor.

MR. WEINBERG: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: In imposing sentence, I am required to consider the factors set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a). These include, first, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; second, the need for the sentence imposed to advance the purposes of sentencing, namely to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed education or vocational training, medical care or correctional treatment in the most effective manner; third, the kinds of sentences available; fourth, the guidelines range, which I have found to be 33 to 41 months' imprisonment;

fifth, any pertinent policy statement; sixth, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and seventh, the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

Ultimately, I am required to impose a sentence that is sufficient, but no greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of sentencing that I mentioned a moment ago.

Needless to say, I have given a lot of thought and attention to the appropriate sentence to impose in this case as I did in Mr. Golubchik's case yesterday, as I have for every defendant I have sentenced thus far in this case.

I will confess that I found Mr. Weinberg's arguments with respect to a departure or variance more effective than the arguments that were made to me yesterday. I will concede that. But nevertheless, I do think, as I did yesterday and as I articulated yesterday, that an upward departure and in the alternative, an upward variance is appropriate here.

The bottom line is that the defendant pleaded guilty to racketeering and money laundering and whether he was the central figure in that money laundering or not, his involvement in it is not disputed and is not minimal. The scale, nature and scope of that conduct is just not something, given the way the guidelines work, that I think is taken into consideration in the guidelines range, which is to say, for the reasons that

I stated yesterday, that there are some anomalies here and whether that is a problem with the gambling provision, 2E3.1, or the money laundering provision, 2S1.1, by delinking completely the amount of money involved from the calculation of the guidelines, I think the commission failed to distinguish among different gradations or different enterprises or money laundering enterprises of different scales.

I think the anomalies are highlighted or exemplified in the calculation of Mr. Azen's guidelines which were higher than the calculation of Mr. Trincher's and Mr. Golubchik's, even though the amount of money he was involved in laundering was substantially less, namely 200- to \$400,000, versus the 50-to \$100 million range that is at issue here.

Again, the bottom line is that when push comes to shove, I don't think that the guidelines adequately take into consideration the scale of these sorts of operations; and again, whether that is a problem with the gambling provision, the money laundering provision, the racketeering provision or the combination thereof, I do think that this case presents aggravating circumstances of a kind, or to a degree, that are not adequately taken into consideration by the sentencing commission.

To put it differently, this conduct in this case distinguishing Mr. Trincher from the heartland of cases, including many of the other defendants that I have seen in this

case.

When push comes to shove, I cannot bring myself to impose a different sentence on Mr. Trincher than I imposed on Mr. Golubchik. From everything I have heard, and I hear that he may have played a different role and been a less sophisticated partner on the money laundering piece of this, it just does not seem to me that there is a meaningful distinction between the two, given the nature of the criminal conduct here and its scope, scale, sophistication and the like.

Any claim that Mr. Trincher thought that what he was doing might have been legal, that he was only engaging in bets outside of the United States and the like is belied by the nature and extent of the money laundering here, which, again, whether he was in charge of it or not, he certainly was heavily involved in it; and whether or not there is any evidence that Mr. Trincher himself was involved in or knew of any specific threats, the specter of violence was, I believe, present in this case as the two calls referenced in the government's submission and the mere fact that Mr. Tokhtakhounov and his status as a vor and his involvement in this case make clear.

Again, when push comes to shove, I just don't see any meaningful distinction to be drawn between Mr. Golubchik who I sentenced yesterday and Mr. Trincher who sits before me today.

Having said that, I will now state the sentence that I intend to impose. Mr. Trincher, would you please rise.

It is the judgment of this Court, Mr. Trincher, that you are remanded to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a period of 60 months, that is five years, to be followed by a period of three years of supervised release.

During your term of supervised release, you will be subject to the following mandatory conditions: You shall not commit another federal, state or local crime. You shall not illegally possess a controlled substance. You shall not possess a firearm or destructive device. You shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to one drug test within 15 days of your release on supervised release and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter as determined by probation. You shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by probation.

In addition, the standard conditions of supervised release shall apply, and you must also meet the following special conditions: First, you shall submit your person, residence, place of business, vehicle or any other premises under your control to a search on the basis that the probation officer has reasonable belief that contraband or evidence of a violation of the conditions of release may be found.

The search must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. Failure to submit to such a search may be grounds for revocation. You shall inform any other residents that the premises may be subject to search pursuant

to this condition.

You shall participate in an alcohol treatment program approved by the United States Probation Department, which program may include testing to determine whether you have reverted to the use of alcohol.

I authorize the release of available alcohol treatment evaluations and reports to the substance abuse treatment provider as approved by the probation officer. You shall be required to contribute to the costs of services rendered; that is, to make a copayment in an amount determined by the probation officer based on your ability to pay or the availability of third-party payment.

You shall provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial information if you have not satisfied your fine, forfeiture obligations or special assessment, which I will mention in a moment. You shall not incur new credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer unless you have satisfied your financial obligations.

You are to report to the nearest probation office within 72 hours of your release from custody and you shall be supervised in the district of your residence. I also order you to pay a fine in the amount of \$75,000 which shall be payable within 30 days of the entry of judgment. I'm also imposing the mandatory special assessment of \$100, which shall be due and

payable immediately.

I also find that pursuant to the terms of my order entered November 14, 2013, you are to forfeit to the United States the property specified in that order which represents the proceeds that you obtained directly or indirectly as a result of or used to facilitate your criminal activity. That obligation shall be joint and several with those of your codefendants.

Again, the record should reflect that I would have imposed the same sentence whether a departure applied under 5K2.0 based on my authority and discretion under Section 3553(a).

Does either counsel know of any legal reason, other than those already argued, why this sentence should not be imposed as stated?

Mr. Weinberg.

MR. WEINBERG: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Naftalis.

MR. NAFTALIS: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: The sentence as stated is imposed.

I find that sentence is sufficient, but no greater than necessary, to satisfy the sentencing purposes set forth in Section 3553(a)(2), including the need to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence to Mr. Trincher and to others, and to

protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.

I should note that I neglected to include in my articulation of why I think a similar sentence is warranted to the extent that Mr. Trincher is distinguishable from Mr. Golubchik, I do think and agree with the government that the involvement of his children in similar conduct is a relevant and aggravating factor to be considered here. That is not to say that I accept the argument or view him as having groomed them to take over his actual operation, but it is not a coincidence, I imagine, that his two children are charged in this case with having engaged in very similar conduct to which Mr. Trincher himself has pleaded guilty. I think that is a relevant factor in crafting and imposing a sentence.

Mr. Weinberg, do you have any requests with respect to designation or the like?

MR. WEINBERG: First, I want to make sure I have protected the record in terms of the arguments that I made to your Honor ranging from the legal arguments, which are fairness and consistency and the kind of due process, ex post facto considerations that are not strictly applicable because we are dealing with guidelines not law; and the argument that this is not outside the heartland; that the government has failed to give your Honor a sufficient basis to show this is an exceptional set of aggravating circumstances; and that the guideline commission has considered and has rejected the volume

or the magnitude as being an appropriate factor for sentencing, as well as my objections to role.

In terms of requests, first, I would request, as
Mr. Golubchik did, the recommendation of an RDAP program.

That's supported by paragraph 68 of the presentence report that shows Mr. Trincher has had difficulties with alcohol and that he would benefit from the Bureau of Prisons' RDAP program.

That would be my first request.

My second request would be for the Court to make a finding, because this deeply influences his eligibility for both camps and programs, and one of the things I'd like him to do is to learn English and develop skills and not just be warehoused during the next years.

I ask you to make a finding that whatever else the R.I.C.O. is charged with and codefendants were charged with, there is no evidence that he personally engaged in offense conduct that involved the use of force, threats, violence. I don't think the record supports that he used violence, that he made threats. And it will be of enormous importance to him given the allegations about others for the Bureau of Prisons to know that factually the Court did not find that he was a violent person who engaged in force or threats of violence.

Third, I would ask for a recommendation to a northeast camp with an RDAP Program.

Fourth, I would ask your Honor not to remand him. I

think there is a principled distinction which is that he walked into court today having full awareness that it was highly, highly likely that despite whatever eloquent arguments I can make to your Honor that you were going to probably impose the same sentence because of the importance of disparity and the importance of proportionality.

With Mr. Golubchik, we knew the government's recommendation. We knew the government would recommend remand, but there's no reason to remand him, Judge. He's not a flight risk. You have a \$10 million bond cosigned by everybody out there, his family, his friends. He's not a flight risk.

He's demonstrated for two years — there's not a shred of evidence they have the right to monitor his phones that he's been engaged in any wrongdoing. There's no danger. He's the same man today that he was two days ago, except if I can respectfully contend he has proven that he is going to meet whatever obligations he has to the Court.

That was something that Mr. Golubchik couldn't prove because he walked in thinking he was getting a guidelines sentence and your Honor made a decision that disappointed him, but Mr. Trincher is here. He'll meet any conditions your Honor sets.

He's got, in addition, several outstanding medical issues. He's got a dental issue. Last night pretrial services allowed him to go to Queens and deal with his dental problems

and, of course, he came back as he promised. The dentist started to fix loose teeth but needs time to finish the work. A letter was faxed, I hope not inappropriately, at probably 10:30 this morning to your Honor's chambers dealing with the outstanding dental issues.

He's got an acute abdomen pain where the doctor is saying he is on medication and undergoing diagnosis. They still have not found the exact cause of it. It's really important when people go to jail for five years they have their dental and medical problems under control.

Lastly, he wants to be here, even if not in court, then at home when his two sons are being sentenced. And he feels a sense of deep responsibility for whatever part of their problems he caused. He'd like to be there for them. He's a good father. He'd like to be there and have some final time with the 12-year-old that's going to miss him deeply for three our four years while he's in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

He's not blaming anybody, but there's no need to remand him, Judge, and there is a principled basis to allow him 60 days out.

Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Let me say a few things at the outset.

One, you have made your record and to the extent that you have preserved issues for appeal, they are preserved.

You made reference to ex post facto. I confess I don't know what you're talking about on that score unless it is a loose term for the argument that this is not something that the defendant expected in pleading guilty pursuant to the agreement that he did.

I don't think there's any ex post facto argument within the technical meaning of that term in the Constitution.

MR. WEINBERG: I agree. I'm talking about the kind of values that they protect a citizen who believes at the time of an offense, that there is a law that sets a certain punishment, that part of the reason I believe your Honor enhanced it is that your Honor, for principled reasons, has determined that the existing guidelines do not match a factor and falls somewhere in the void between these three factors. It's not just the aggravation of the facts, but it's also that the guidelines, in your Honor's judgment — and I believe that if you went before other judges, they would have a different judgment about the adequacy of these guidelines that are in effect so long.

It's not that he's entitled by some legislative action after the fact to the full implications of ex post facto protection; it's more the arguments about predictability and consistency and that citizens should get what they expected or what the law suggests they should expect.

Yes, this is 3553. Yes, it's advisory. I don't make

a complete unconditional ex post facto argument. I do say that some of the values implicated are relevant in terms of the enhancement of the guidelines here, your Honor.

THE COURT: Again, you have made your record. I'm not aware of any ex post facto restriction on a Court exercising its discretion to craft an appropriate sentence within the statutory maximum and consistent with the law, but, again, you have made your record.

I will recommend that the Bureau of Prisons consider Mr. Trincher for the RDAP program, assuming that he is eligible based on his recent history of the use of alcohol.

With respect to the issue of threats, I'm certainly prepared to say that I have not seen any evidence tying Mr. Trincher directly to any particular threats or the use of violence, but I think I made my record earlier that I think the racketeering enterprise as a whole is certainly linked to, at a minimum, the specter of violence, if only through the person in the position of Tokhtakhounov. To the extent that Mr. Trincher allied himself and affiliated himself with Tokhtakhounov, then he is connected to it.

But again, I certainly have not seen any evidence that Mr. Trincher himself has exercised any violence or used any threats of violence himself.

MR. WEINBERG: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: I will recommend that he be designated to

a facility in the northeast, as close as possible to New York, to facilitate the maintenance of ties to his family.

On the question of remand, Mr. Naftalis, do you wish to be heard on that question?

In particular, I think Mr. Weinberg makes a reasonably compelling point that Mr. Trincher is distinguishable from Mr. Golubchik in the sense that he showed up today having a pretty good sense of what might be coming down for him.

Could you address that issue.

MR. NAFTALIS: Your Honor, we think remand is appropriate. I don't see him as any different from Mr. Golubchik. The fact that you may have a better sense as to what your sentence will be -- they both knew they were going to jail and they both showed up.

The fact that you have a better sense that it's longer, I understand the argument. I'm not going to say it. He's certainly less of a risk of flight, but I don't think it means he should not be remanded.

I don't think the medical issue -- honestly, he's been out for a year. Every defendant has medical issues before they go in. When they know they're going in, they should deal with them; and if not, the Bureau of Prisons is more than capable of dealing with what sounds like relatively minor issues.

I don't think showing up for court necessarily means you don't go in. That's what it comes down to. Mr. Golubchik

showed up, too.

THE COURT: I have to say I think that is a close call. I do think that Mr. Weinberg's argument gives me pause. I think, upon reflection, I don't see any reason to delay remand, and I don't think that the medical reasons warrant delaying remand.

I will therefore order that the defendant be remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

MR. WEINBERG: Could I ask your Honor to reconsider that decision at least for a short period, a two-week period, where he would be able to resolve these dental issues and finish his medical treatment.

Going to jail and trusting BOP dentists is not a good thing. He's not a flight risk. We're not asking any longer for the 60 days that others have gotten.

THE COURT: Mr. Weinberg, I have made my ruling. The answer is no.

MR. WEINBERG: Can I make one last request: Let him surrender at 3:00 today. The act of surrendering rather than being locked up gives you all kinds of security level reductions.

THE COURT: Mr. Weinberg, I have made my ruling.

The marshal is directed to take the defendant into custody. I assume that the marshal will coordinate with pretrial to remove the ankle bracelet if that's an issue here,

E4ugtrins as well. 1 2 Is there a motion with respect to other counts? 3 MR. NAFTALIS: Yes. The government moves to dismiss 4 all open counts. 5 THE COURT: All counts other than Count One with 6 respect to Mr. Trincher are dismissed. 7 Mr. Trincher, to the extent you have not given up your right to appeal, your conviction and sentence through the plea 8 9 of guilty and the agreement that you entered into with the 10 government, you have the right to appeal. 11 If you cannot afford to pay the costs of an appeal, 12 you may apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 13 notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of entry of the 14 judgment of conviction. 15 Is there anything further, Mr. Naftalis? 16 MR. NAFTALIS: No, your Honor. Thank you. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Weinberg. 18 MR. WEINBERG: No, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: We are adjourned. Thank you. 20 (Adjourned) 21 22 23

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